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CONFERENCE
MANAGING AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS:
PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS*
James L. Huffman**
The presumption of this conference is that a new public lands policy
is needed; that, as former EPA Chief Council Donald Elliott has said of
our environmental laws, "you can't get there from here [using present
methods]."' I believe this presumption is valid. Based upon a reading of
their preliminary papers, I would say that all but one of our panel participants accepts this presumption. This means that our discussion will pass
muster under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 2 -we will
examine several alternatives including that of no action.3
My assignment is to describe our existing laws and, given the presumption of this conference, to explain what is wrong with them. Bob
Keiter of the University of Utah has done an excellent job of providing
some historical context. What Bob has described, at least from Gifford
Pinchot and Teddy Roosevelt forward, is the product of Progressivism.4

* These introductory remarks were delivered by the author at a conference held October 2425,1 1996 in Missoula, Montana. The conference was jointly sponsored by the Public Land & Resources Law Review of the University of Montana School of Law and the University of Montana
School of Forestry.
**
Dean and Professor of Law, Northwest School of Law, Lewis & Clark College; J.D., 1972,
University of Chicago; MA, 1969, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University; B.S.,
1967, Montana State University.
1. E. Donald Elliott, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program that
Works!, 92 MtcH. L. REV.1840, 1847-48 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
3. NEPA regulations require that environmental impact statements present the impacts of the
proposed action as well as all reasonable alternatives, including the "no action" alternative. See 40
C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1996).
4. The term refers to that ideology which emphasizes the role of government in the furtherance of humanistic reform. See WEBsmT's THRD NEw ]INrERNATIoNAL DIcnoNARY (1963).
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Therein lies part of the failure of our public land laws.
The defiming goals of our current public land policy are two: multiple
use and sustainability. Nothing we have done since the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act5 has altered these guiding values. The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resource Planning Act of 1974,6 the National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA),7 and the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 are all Progressivist solutions to a perceived
failure to achieve these values in our public lands management. In that
same Progressivist tradition are NEPA, the Endangered Species Acte and
most of the rest of our environmental laws.
Now two decades after NFMA, we are still in search of better public
lands policies. Notwithstanding the creative proposals of some of our
panelists, I will predict that we will continue in the Progressive tradition,
and that we (or more likely others) can therefore expect to be back here
two decades hence to again seek solutions to what by then will be well
over a century of failed public lands policies. Why this "vicious circle," to
borrow a phrase from Justice Stephen Breyer?'I
The naivete of Progressivism is half of the problem. The other half is
a failure to understand and respect the most basic teachings of the political
theory of our national founders.
First, the naivete of Progressivism. The Progressives believed in
scientific management. Not just that science could provide information and
understanding which would be useful to public lands management, but that
it could substitute for the messy politics which had dominated public land
policy through the 19th century. The idea was simple. Good science would
provide good information which would be used by good public officials to
reach good decisions. Thus would be served the public interest.1'
Most of the public lands and environmental legislation of this century
has been firmly rooted in this scientific management tradition. Throughout,
there have been constant objections that the public interest is not being
served, that special interests are in control, that the public welfare is being
sacrificed to partisan politics. Our solution has always been more of the
same, but better. Even my colleague Michael Blumm acknowledges that

5.
16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
6.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994). The provisions of this Act were incorporated and revised
by the National Forest Management Act. See "Short Title" notations following 16 U.S.C. § 1600.
7.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
8.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
9.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
10. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECrVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
11.
See, e.g., GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 291-94 (Island Press 1987) (1947);
see also Robert H. Nelson, Government as Theater: Toward a New Paradigmfor the Public Lands, 65
U. COLO. L. REv. 335, 344 (1994).
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the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act has failed,' 2 and most will acknowledge that forest planning has been a nightmarish waste of resources
and human energy. But we persevere. And now the scientific managers
have finally hit upon the solution. They have finally gotten it right. Ecosystem management will assure that science buries politics once and for
all.
This Progressivist search for the silver bullet of scientific management reminds me of a story I heard many years ago. A solo climber was
ascending the North Face of Granite Peak in the Beartooth Mountains, just
north of Yellowstone and, I should note, within the Greater Yellowstone
Ecosystem, to which I will return later. As he neared the top he lost his
footing and began to fall to certain death 2000 feet below. But fortune
was on his side. As he fell, his hand managed to grasp a small outcropping of rock. And so he hung by one hand with no chance of climbing
back up and only a matter of time before he lost his grip. In desperation
he thought perhaps another climber might be on top of the mountain. If
so, he might have a rope which he could lower to our stranded climber.
"Is anyone up there?" he shouted. Silence. "IS ANYONE UP THERE?"
he shouted a second time. To his surprise and delight a booming voice
responded, "YES, I AM UP HERE, WHAT DO YOU WANT." "Please
help me," said the climber. "DO YOU BELIEVE?" asked the booming
voice. "Oh yes, I believe," said the climber. "IF YOU BELIEVE, LET GO
OF THE ROCK." There was a long silence, and then our climber said "is
anyone else up there?" Like the climber, our latter day Progressives are
looking for better approaches to scientific management of our public
lands.
Our public land managers have now embarked upon their most ambitious scientific management effort yet-ecosystem management. Notwithstanding that the public land laws do not authorize it, and I say that in
spite of the fact that Judge Dwyer has found such authorization somewhere in the penumbras of those laws,' 3 our public land managers are
full swing into ecosystem planning and management. And they believe
they are really doing it. For example, the manager of the Cabeza Prieta
National Wildlife Refuge, the largest in the lower forty-eight states, has
the temerity to say that "We're managing whole ecosystems with a staff of
only six."' 4 Greater hubris I cannot imagine. Nor can I imagine a greater
12. See generally Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use" Failed, 18 HARv. ENvTi. L. REv. 405 (1994).
13. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1310-11- (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(finding authorization to manage ecosystems based on language of ESA and NFMA, and mention of
ecosystems in NEPA regulations, which Dwyer interprets as allowing, if not requiring planning for
entire biological communities).
14. See Douglas H. Chadwick, Sanctuary: U.S. NationalWildlife Refuges, NAT'L GEOGRAPHmc,
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threat to the fundamental values of liberty and freedom which founded this
country and have been the envy of the world ever since.
The idea of ecosystem management is this. Because every action
taken on the public lands will have unintended environmental effects on
and off the public lands, and because every action taken on private and
state lands will have similar unintended environmental consequences, these
actions should only be taken in the context of an ecosystem plan. The
purpose here is to assure that the ecosystem remains viable and sustainable.
The central assumption is that everything is connected to everything
else, which is no doubt true in some ultimate sense. Of course this means
that ecosystems are difficult to define, but assuming that we can agree on
a definition (here we will turn to science for the answer), contemplate the
task of the ecosystem planner and manager.
Take an example right here in the Northern Rockies-the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem. Ah, the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, it already rolls off the tongue as if it really exists thanks to the concerted
efforts over the last decade or so of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition. 5
The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem encompasses parts of three states,
probably a dozen counties, and perhaps a hundred municipalities. It also
encompasses vast areas of federal land under the jurisdiction of several
federal agencies and no doubt some state lands as well. I know all of this
because I have seen the map of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem which
appears regularly in the newsletter of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition.
Not identified on that map, but an additional challenge for the ecosystem
planners, are thousands of private properties.
Imagine that you are the ecosystem manager for the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem. Where do you begin? Perhaps you could undertake a
biological survey after which you will know more than you know now,
but certainly not everything there is to know. And what about the economy of the region and all of the governmental authorities and the private
property owners? This is a challenge far greater than economic planning
without regard for the environment, and we know how that has worked
out wherever it has been tried.
How can we be so audacious or naive as to believe that we can really
do ecosystem management? The variables are beyond counting, not to
mention beyond management. But even if we could acquire the requisite
knowledge and somehow make the decisions which are right for the eco-

Oct. 1996, at 6-7.
15. The Greater Yellowstone Coalition is a private conservation group dedicated to "preserve
and protect the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem and the unique quality of life it sustains." 13 Greater
Yellowstone Report (a quarterly journal of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition) Summer 1996, at 2.
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system (will science tell us what is right?), we do not have the political
wisdom to implement those decisions.
Wuch brings me to the second reason why we are unlikely to reform
our public lands laws to anyone's satisfaction. The Progressive belief m
scientific management is rooted in an effort to escape political management. How often do we hear interests of all sides of the public lands debate lament that a particular decision is political and call for decisions
based on good science? We hear a constant plea for bipartisan action in
the public interest, or better yet, as Associate Justice Steven Breyer proposes in Closing the Vicious Circle, for expert decision making which can
sidestep politics altogether. 6
Let me remind you of a truth about government which our constitutional founders well understood. We cannot escape politics. Government is
politics, particularly democratic government. Public lands are, as Rick
Stroup taught me many years ago, political lands. That is the point. That
is why they are public lands. Somewhere in the late Nineteenth century it
was decided that these lands should not be left to private acquisition and
management precisely because governmental, which is to say political,
management was thought to be preferable. Numerous commissions and
Congresses, including the just adjourned 104th, have revisited this issue
with the same result."
What our national founders understood about government is that we
cannot escape politics. They understood, as a result of their experiences
under both the English Crown and the Articles of Confederation, that, as
much as we might appeal to the good will and civic republicamsm of
those who govern, the power of government must be constrained or it will
be abused. The temptations of power corrupt even the best among us. And
it is not just lngs who abuse power. Madison warned of the tyranny of
the majority, and, in an extended republic of multiple factions where the
legislative process depends upon horse trading and log rolling, of the
tyranny of minorities.
In the public lands context there is no better evidence of these political realities than the fact that a mere 25,000 holders of grazing permits 8

16. See supra note 10 at 59.
17. The 104th Congress faced various proposals for the pnvatization of some or many public
lands. See, e.g., H.R. 257, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (intent of bill was to transfer BLM lands to
states and private entities); H.R. 1923, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (intent of bill was to sell of public lands to reduce federal deficit). Similar proposals have been made throughout this century. See
generally George Cameron Coggins, The Public Interest in PublicLand Law: A Commentary on the
Policies of Secretary Watt, 4 PuB. LAND L REv. 1 (1983).
18. About 30,000 grazing permits and leases are issued for BLM and Forest Service rangelands.
However, some of these permittees graze more than 1 allotment, and 15% graze both BLM and Forest
Service lands. Thus, the actual number of permittees grazing BLM and Forest Service land in the 16
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were able to stymie the early reform efforts of the Clinton administration.19 As I have argued in an article in the Colorado Law Review, public
lands law is the product of a history of competing private interests seeking
to extract wealth, including the wealth of environmental quality, from the
federal lands.' No matter how much we appeal to science and wise management in the public interest, we cannot escape the simple reality that
public land management is politics.
True reform will only come with basic institutional change. The
framers of the Constitution understood that structure is everything if we
seek to limit opportunities for private interests to exploit the immense
powers of government. For them it was the structure of separation of
powers and federalism. Because these structural limits have been largely
abrogated by an assertive Congress and Executive and a compliant Supreme Court, the challenge to reform federal lands management is daunting.
We have decades of Supreme Court precedent confirming the unlimited power of Congress and deferring to the expertise of agencies. The latter
is a product of the Progressive faith in scientific management, the former
of an ends-focused jurisprudence which has ignored the concept of enumerated powers, the Tenth Amendment, and the economic liberties explicit
in the Constitution. Without these constitutional limits on the exercise of
federal power, we have little hope of reining in the private interest rentseeking which defines our public lands politics.
Our only hope for meaningful reform is to recognize that incentives
matter and that institutional arrangements are critical to the incentives
faced by both public and private resource managers. Without a return to
constitutionally limited government, our prospects for institutional reform
are dim. Perhaps the Lopez,2 Seminole Tribe' and Dolan' cases offer

Western states is about 23,000. LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE WEST: PUBLIC LANDS RANCHING 25
(1991) (citing COMMIrEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEDERAL GRAZING PROGRAM: ALL Is NOT
WELL ON THE RANGE, (1986)).
19. See Dover A. Norris-York, Comment, The FederalAdvisory Committee Act: Barrier or
Boon to Effective Natural Resource Management?, 26 ENVTL. L. 419, 434 n.125 (1996).
20. James Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev.
241 (1994).
21.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that law banning guns in school
zones did not pass constitutional muster because prohibited activity did not substantially affect interstate commerce).
22. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1127-31 (1996) (holding that the
Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, did not grant Congress power to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
23. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The Dolan Court, quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), stated that "one of the principle purposes of the Takings Clause
is 'to bar Government from forcing people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' Id. at 384. The Court suggests that governmental
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a flicker of hope, but that small flame will surely be extinguished not too
long after the almost certain reelection of Bill Clinton.
On that pessimistic note, which many will see as reason for optinusm, we will now turn to the other members of our panel to propose
institutional reforms which might well make a difference, if they can
somehow overcome the obstacles of interest group politics.

entities may not effect a "taking" by requiring that private landowners dedicate their land to public use
as a precondition to the granting of building permits, variances, and other such discretionary pnvileges, unless the required dedication is reasonably related to the impact of the proposed development and
is "rough[ly] proportional[]" to the extent of the impact. Id. at 389-90.

